Iranian-aligned hacktivist group Handala deploys destructive wiper malware against $100B medical technology giant Stryker Corporation — wiping 200,000+ devices, defacing Entra login portals, and shutting down operations across 79 countries.
On March 11, 2026, Stryker Corporation — a Fortune 200 medical technology company headquartered in Portage, Michigan — experienced a catastrophic cyberattack attributed to Handala (a.k.a. Handala Hack Team), a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group with strong ties to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
The attack deployed destructive wiper malware that permanently erased data from corporate servers, endpoint devices, and personal smartphones enrolled in Stryker's Microsoft Intune mobile device management. The attackers defaced Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) login pages with Handala's distinctive logo and remotely wiped managed devices at approximately 3:30 AM EDT.
Over 5,500 employees in Cork, Ireland — Stryker's largest hub outside the US — were sent home. Operations halted across manufacturing, R&D, and engineering facilities worldwide. The company's main US headquarters voicemail reported a "building emergency." Stryker stock dropped approximately 4% within hours.
Handala claimed the operation affected 200,000+ systems and exfiltrated 50 terabytes of data. While these figures remain unverified, the operational impact is confirmed by multiple sources including Stryker's own statements, Irish media, and employee reports.
Stryker confirmed: "We have no indication of ransomware or malware." This was a destructive wiper attack — the goal was permanent data destruction, not extortion. Wiper attacks may cause irreversible data loss with no recovery path. This aligns with Handala's documented operational doctrine of disruption over monetization.
This attack comes ~2 weeks after US-Israeli strikes against Iran (late February 2026). CSIS analysis warns this marks "the beginning of a new phase of cyber escalation" under Iran's "Great Epic" cyber campaign. Handala explicitly framed this as retaliation for the "attack on a school in Minab" and "ongoing cyber assaults against the Resistance Axis."
Multiple independent vendors and government sources have converged on attributing Handala to the same MOIS-linked cluster:
| Vendor | Cluster Name | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Check Point Research | Void Manticore | HIGH |
| Microsoft | Storm-0842 / Storm-842 | HIGH |
| CrowdStrike | BANISHED KITTEN | HIGH |
| Recorded Future | Dune | MEDIUM-HIGH |
| Sophos | COBALT MYSTIQUE | MEDIUM-HIGH |
| IBM X-Force | Handala Hacking Team | HIGH |
"Handala" refers to a character created in 1969 by Palestinian political cartoonist Naji al-Ali — a barefoot boy with his back turned, symbolizing Palestinian identity and defiance. The hacktivist group adopted this symbolism upon emergence in December 2023, shortly after the onset of the Gaza conflict.
The group operates as an influence-enabled intrusion threat — not a traditional cybercrime or espionage actor. Their operational model fuses technical compromise with rapid public messaging, timed data leaks, and narrative amplification designed to maximize reputational damage beyond direct system impact.
Key characteristics:
1. Initial Access — Handala typically uses spear-phishing with current-events lures. For the Stryker attack, initial access vector is under investigation. Previous campaigns used phishing PDFs masquerading as software updates, SMS phishing, and abuse of trusted supplier channels. The attackers gained access to administrative accounts with Intune/Entra management privileges.
2. Payload Delivery — Documented Handala toolkit uses NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) installers containing obfuscated batch scripts. Files within the NSIS package use no-file-extensions to evade static analysis. Commercial file-sharing services (Storj, Mega) used for payload hosting.
3. Execution — Batch script ("Carroll") copies itself to .cmd extension and executes. Contains garbage/invalid Windows commands interspersed with real instructions to hinder analysis. Checks for AV processes (Webroot, Quick Heal, Avast, AVG, Bitdefender, Norton, Sophos) and introduces 90–180 second delays if not found.
4. Defense Evasion — Multi-component payload distributed across several files, concatenated at runtime into AutoIt3.exe and .a3x script. Simple string obfuscation in AutoIt component. Architecture-aware shellcode (x32/x64) using RtlDecompressFragment() API.
5. Impact — Wiper overwrites files with 4,096 bytes of random data (files < 4,096 bytes overwritten with zeroes). Files deleted after overwrite. BYOVD technique using ListOpenedFileDrv_32.sys driver to access kernel memory for file enumeration. Deceptive "update installation" message box displayed while wiping occurs. System information exfiltrated to Telegram bot C2 before destruction.
| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Handala Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1566.001 | Spear Phishing Attachment | PDF with malicious URL, current-events lures |
| Initial Access | T1566.002 | Spear Phishing Link | SMS phishing, links to Storj/Mega hosted payloads |
| Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Historical: SharePoint CVE-2019-0604 exploitation |
| Execution | T1059 | Command & Scripting Interpreter | NSIS installer → batch script → AutoIt execution chain |
| Execution | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Obfuscated .cmd batch scripts with garbage commands |
| Execution | T1059.010 | AutoHotKey & AutoIT | AutoIt shellcode loader, architecture-aware (x32/x64) |
| Execution | T1204.002 | User Execution: Malicious File | Victim opens phishing PDF and downloads fake update |
| Persistence | T1505.003 | Web Shell | ASPX webshells (pickers.aspx, error4.aspx, ClientBin.aspx) |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | BYOVD: ListOpenedFileDrv_32.sys for kernel memory access |
| Defense Evasion | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Batch script garbage code, no-extension files in NSIS |
| Defense Evasion | T1497.003 | Time Based Evasion | 90–180s sleep via ping -n when no AV detected |
| Credential Access | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory Dumping | Credential harvesting from compromised hosts |
| Discovery | T1590 | Gather Victim Network Information | IP, hostname, username, domain, disk space collection |
| Discovery | T1589 | Gather Victim Identity Information | Public IP check via icanhazip[.]com |
| Lateral Movement | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | RDP/SMB-heavy lateral movement patterns |
| Lateral Movement | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Internal pivoting via administrative shares |
| Collection | T1005 | Data from Local System | System enumeration before wiper detonation |
| Exfiltration | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | Victim data auto-sent to Telegram bot C2 |
| Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Exfil Over Web Service | Telegram API used for C2 and data exfiltration |
| Impact | T1485 | Data Destruction | File overwrite with random data + deletion |
| Impact | T1561.002 | Disk Structure Wipe | 4,096-byte random overwrite renders systems unbootable |
| Impact | T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Destruction of recovery mechanisms alongside data |
| Impact | T1491 | Defacement | Entra/Azure AD login page branded with Handala logo |
Treat channel/claim-only indicators as soft IOCs until telemetry confirms compromise. Revalidate all network indicators against current blocklists and passive-DNS before production blocking. Hashes below are from documented Handala campaigns (Jul 2024 wiper + historical MOIS cluster). Stryker-specific IOCs are pending disclosure.
| SHA-256 | Description | Source |
|---|---|---|
| d0c03d40772cd468325bbc522402f7b737f18b8f37a89bacc5c8a00c2b87bfc6 | BiBi Wiper variant | Check Point / MOIS cluster |
| deeaf85b2725289d5fc262b4f60dda0c68ae42d8d46d0dc19b9253b451aea25a | Destructive payload | Check Point / Void Manticore |
| 87f0a902d6b2e2ae3647f10ea214d19db9bd117837264ae15d622b5314ff03a5 | Wiper component | Check Point |
| 85fa58cc8c4560adb955ba0ae9b9d6cab2c381d10dbd42a0bceb8b62a92b7636 | GoXML.exe encryptor | Check Point |
| 74d8d60e900f931526a911b7157511377c0a298af986d42d373f51aac4f362f6 | cl.exe wiper component | Check Point |
| cc77e8ab73b577de1924e2f7a93bcfd852b3c96c6546229bc8b80bf3fd7bf24e | rwdsk.sys driver | Check Point |
| 9e519211947c63d9bf6f4a51bc161f5b9ace596c2935a8eedfce4057f747b961 | ListOpenedFileDrv_32.sys (BYOVD) | Splunk/Talos |
| Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| 64.176.169.22 | IPv4 | MOIS cluster infrastructure |
| 64.176.172.101 | IPv4 | Void Manticore C2 |
| 64.176.172.165 | IPv4 | Void Manticore C2 |
| 64.176.172.235 | IPv4 | Void Manticore infrastructure |
| 64.176.173.77 | IPv4 | MOIS cluster infrastructure |
| 64.176.172.0/24 | CIDR Range | Recurring Handala/Void Manticore infra block |
| icanhazip[.]com | URL | Public IP check (victim recon, not inherently malicious) |
| api.telegram[.]org/bot* | URL Pattern | C2 communication via Telegram Bot API |
| storjshare[.]io | Domain | Payload hosting (Jul 2024 campaign) |
| Artifact | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Carroll | File | Obfuscated batch script (copied to Carroll.cmd) |
| Carroll.cmd | File | Executed batch script with AV evasion + payload staging |
| AutoIt3.exe | File | Concatenated from fragments, loads .a3x shellcode |
| L (no extension) | File | .a3x AutoIt compiled script (wiper loader) |
| ListOpenedFileDrv_32.sys | Driver | BYOVD driver for kernel file enumeration |
| OpenFileFinder.dll | DLL | Loads BYOVD driver as service |
| error4.aspx | Webshell | ASPX persistence (historical) |
| ClientBin.aspx | Webshell | ASPX persistence (historical) |
| pickers.aspx | Webshell | ASPX persistence (historical) |
| cl.exe | Executable | Wiper component (context-dependent — correlate with hash) |
| GoXML.exe | Executable | Encryptor/wiper paired with cl.exe |
| rwdsk.sys | Driver | RawDisk driver used in destructive operations |
| Directory: 564784 | Directory | Created to stage AutoIt components |
| Channel | Status | Use |
|---|---|---|
| t.me/HANDALA_RSS | Primary (went silent Feb 2025, resumed Jul 2025) | Claims, leak announcements, C2 coordination |
| @Handala_Backup | Active (post-X ban migration) | Backup claims channel |
title: Handala Wiper - Carroll Batch Script Execution
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala1-2026-stryker001
status: experimental
description: Detects execution pattern of Handala wiper batch script (Carroll → Carroll.cmd copy and execute)
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/handalas-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cmd_copy:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'copy'
- 'Carroll'
- '.cmd'
selection_cmd_exec:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Carroll.cmd'
condition: selection_cmd_copy or selection_cmd_exec
falsepositives:
- Unlikely in legitimate environments
level: critical
title: Handala Wiper - Antivirus Process Discovery
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala2-2026-stryker002
status: experimental
description: Detects batch script checking for multiple AV processes before payload staging (Handala evasion pattern)
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/handalas-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1518.001
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1497.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tasklist:
CommandLine|contains: 'tasklist'
filter_av_names:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'wrsa.exe'
- 'opssvc.exe'
- 'avastui.exe'
- 'avgui.exe'
- 'bdservicehost.exe'
- 'nswscsvc.exe'
- 'sophoshealth.exe'
condition: selection_tasklist and filter_av_names
falsepositives:
- IT inventory scripts that enumerate running AV processes
level: high
title: Handala Wiper - BYOVD ListOpenedFileDrv Driver Loading
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala3-2026-stryker003
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of ListOpenedFileDrv driver used by Handala for kernel-level file enumeration before wiping
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/handalas-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_driver:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- 'ListOpenedFileDrv_32.sys'
- 'ListOpenedFileDrv.sys'
selection_pdb:
ImageLoaded|contains: 'openfilefinder'
condition: selection_driver or selection_pdb
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of OpenFileFinder utility (rare)
level: critical
title: Handala Wiper - AutoIt Injection into Regasm.exe
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala4-2026-stryker004
status: experimental
description: Detects AutoIt-based shellcode injection into Regasm.exe process (Handala wiper delivery)
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/handalas-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.010
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_autoit_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: 'AutoIt3.exe'
selection_regasm_child:
Image|endswith: 'RegAsm.exe'
condition: selection_autoit_parent and selection_regasm_child
falsepositives:
- AutoIt scripts legitimately invoking .NET assembly registration (uncommon)
level: critical
title: Handala Wiper - Ping-Based Sleep Evasion
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala5-2026-stryker005
status: experimental
description: Detects use of ping -n with high count for time-based evasion (90-180 second delays)
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1497.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: 'ping -n'
filter_high_count:
CommandLine|re: 'ping\s+-n\s+(9[0-9]|1[0-8][0-9])\s+'
condition: selection and filter_high_count
falsepositives:
- Network testing scripts using long ping counts
level: medium
title: Handala Wiper - Telegram Bot API Communication
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala6-2026-stryker006
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound HTTP(S) connections to Telegram Bot API used as C2 by Handala wiper
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.002
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
product: network
detection:
selection:
url|contains:
- 'api.telegram.org/bot'
method: 'POST'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Telegram bot integrations (correlate with process context)
level: high
title: Handala Wiper - NSIS Package Suspicious File Creation
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala7-2026-stryker007
status: experimental
description: Detects NSIS installer creating files without extensions in suspicious paths (Handala payload staging)
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.defense_evasion
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_nsis:
Image|endswith:
- '\makensis.exe'
- '\nsis.exe'
selection_suspicious_path:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\windows\temp\'
- '\users\public\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\564784\'
filter_no_extension:
TargetFilename|re: '\\[^.\\]+$'
condition: (selection_nsis or selection_suspicious_path) and filter_no_extension
falsepositives:
- Legitimate NSIS installers (rare to create no-extension files)
level: high
title: Handala Wiper - Mass File Overwrite Detection
id: a7e3f0f0-hand-ala8-2026-stryker008
status: experimental
description: Detects rapid file modification pattern consistent with wiper behavior (mass 4096-byte overwrites)
author: HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1485
- attack.t1561.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventType: 'FileModified'
timeframe: 60s
condition: selection | count() by Image > 100
falsepositives:
- Disk encryption tools, legitimate bulk file operations
level: critical
rule Handala_Wiper_Carroll_Batch {
meta:
description = "Detects Handala wiper obfuscated batch script (Carroll)"
author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-03-11"
reference = "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/handalas-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html"
tlp = "TLP:CLEAR"
severity = "CRITICAL"
strings:
$cmd_copy = "cmd /k copy" ascii nocase
$carroll = "Carroll" ascii
$cmd_ext = ".cmd" ascii
$exit = "& exit" ascii
// AV process checks
$av1 = "wrsa.exe" ascii nocase
$av2 = "opssvc.exe" ascii nocase
$av3 = "avastui.exe" ascii nocase
$av4 = "avgui.exe" ascii nocase
$av5 = "bdservicehost.exe" ascii nocase
$av6 = "nswscsvc.exe" ascii nocase
$av7 = "sophoshealth.exe" ascii nocase
// Time delay evasion
$ping_delay = "ping -n" ascii nocase
condition:
filesize < 500KB and
(($cmd_copy and $carroll and $cmd_ext) or
(3 of ($av*) and $ping_delay))
}
rule Handala_Wiper_AutoIt_Loader {
meta:
description = "Detects Handala AutoIt-based wiper payload loader"
author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-03-11"
severity = "CRITICAL"
strings:
$autoit_header = "#AutoIt3Wrapper" ascii
$rtl_decompress = "RtlDecompressFragment" ascii wide
$shellcode_x86 = { 55 8B EC 83 EC ?? 53 56 57 }
$shellcode_x64 = { 48 89 5C 24 ?? 48 89 74 24 ?? 57 48 83 EC }
$regasm = "RegAsm" ascii wide nocase
$inject_api = "NtWriteVirtualMemory" ascii wide
$create_proc = "CreateProcessA" ascii wide
condition:
filesize < 5MB and
($autoit_header or $rtl_decompress) and
($regasm or $inject_api or $create_proc) and
any of ($shellcode_*)
}
rule Handala_Wiper_Disk_Overwrite {
meta:
description = "Detects Handala wiper disk overwrite component"
author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-03-11"
severity = "CRITICAL"
strings:
// File overwrite patterns
$overwrite_func = { 8B ?? ?? 83 ?? 00 10 00 00 } // 4096 byte check
$random_fill = "RtlGenRandom" ascii wide
$zero_fill = { C7 ?? 00 00 00 00 C7 ?? 04 00 00 00 00 }
// System info gathering (pre-wipe recon)
$hostname = "COMPUTERNAME" ascii wide
$username = "USERNAME" ascii wide
$domain = "USERDOMAIN" ascii wide
$diskspace = "GetDiskFreeSpaceEx" ascii wide
// Telegram C2
$telegram = "api.telegram.org" ascii wide
$bot_token = "/bot" ascii wide
$send_msg = "sendMessage" ascii wide
$send_doc = "sendDocument" ascii wide
// IP check
$ip_check = "icanhazip.com" ascii wide
condition:
filesize < 10MB and
(2 of ($overwrite_func, $random_fill, $zero_fill)) and
(2 of ($hostname, $username, $domain, $diskspace)) and
($telegram or $ip_check)
}
rule Handala_BYOVD_ListOpenedFileDrv {
meta:
description = "Detects BYOVD driver used by Handala for kernel file enumeration"
author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-03-11"
severity = "HIGH"
strings:
$pdb = "openfilefinder_src" ascii nocase
$driver_name = "ListOpenedFileDrv" ascii wide nocase
$device_io = "DeviceIoControl" ascii wide
$file_object = "FILE_OBJECT" ascii wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
filesize < 100KB and
($pdb or $driver_name) and
($device_io or $file_object)
}
rule Handala_NSIS_NoExtension_Payload {
meta:
description = "Detects NSIS installer with no-extension payload files (Handala delivery)"
author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-03-11"
severity = "HIGH"
strings:
$nsis_header = { EF BE AD DE 4E 75 6C 6C } // NSIS magic
$nsis_str = "Nullsoft" ascii
$cmd_copy_pattern = "cmd /k copy" ascii nocase
$autoit_ref = "AutoIt" ascii nocase
$concat_pattern = /copy\s+\/b\s+\w+\+\w+/ ascii nocase
condition:
($nsis_header or $nsis_str) and
($cmd_copy_pattern or $autoit_ref or $concat_pattern)
}
rule Handala_BiBi_Wiper_Family {
meta:
description = "Detects BiBi wiper variants associated with Handala/Void Manticore"
author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-03-11"
reference = "Check Point Research - Void Manticore"
severity = "CRITICAL"
strings:
$bibi_str1 = "BiBi" ascii wide nocase
$bibi_str2 = "[+] Stats:" ascii
$wiper_msg = "You have been pwned" ascii wide nocase
$ext_target = ".pdf" ascii
$ext_target2 = ".docx" ascii
$ext_target3 = ".xlsx" ascii
// Disk operations
$raw_disk = "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive" ascii wide
$partition = "\\\\.\\PHYSICALDRIVE" ascii wide
$mbr_access = { B8 00 00 00 00 BA 00 00 00 00 }
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
filesize < 5MB and
(($bibi_str1 or $bibi_str2 or $wiper_msg) and
($raw_disk or $partition or $mbr_access))
}