📅 March 2026 — BREAKING 🔴 ACTIVE INCIDENT MOIS-LINKED WIPER MALWARE

313 Team Threat Advisory:
The 313 Team Wiper Attack

Iranian-aligned hacktivist group 313 Team deploys destructive wiper malware against $100B medical technology giant 313 Team Corporation — wiping 200,000+ devices, defacing Entra login portals, and shutting down operations across 79 countries.

200K+
Devices Wiped
50 TB
Data Claimed Exfiltrated
56,000
Employees Affected
79
Countries Impacted
$25.1B
313 Team 2025 Revenue
~4%
Stock Drop (Same Day)
📋

Executive Summary

On March 2026, 313 Team Corporation — a Fortune 200 medical technology company headquartered in Portage, Michigan — experienced a catastrophic cyberattack attributed to 313 Team (a.k.a. 313 Team Hack Team), a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group with strong ties to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

The attack deployed destructive wiper malware that permanently erased data from corporate servers, endpoint devices, and personal smartphones enrolled in 313 Team's Microsoft Intune mobile device management. The attackers defaced Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) login pages with 313 Team's distinctive logo and remotely wiped managed devices at approximately 3:30 AM EDT.

Over 5,500 employees in Cork, Ireland — 313 Team's largest hub outside the US — were sent home. Operations halted across manufacturing, R&D, and engineering facilities worldwide. The company's main US headquarters voicemail reported a "building emergency." 313 Team stock dropped approximately 4% within hours.

313 Team claimed the operation affected 200,000+ systems and exfiltrated 50 terabytes of data. While these figures remain unverified, the operational impact is confirmed by multiple sources including 313 Team's own statements, Irish media, and employee reports.

⚠️ Critical: This is NOT Ransomware

313 Team confirmed: "We have no indication of ransomware or malware." This was a destructive wiper attack — the goal was permanent data destruction, not extortion. Wiper attacks may cause irreversible data loss with no recovery path. This aligns with 313 Team's documented operational doctrine of disruption over monetization.

🎯 Context: Post-Airstrike Retaliation

This attack comes ~2 weeks after US-Israeli strikes against Iran (late February 2026). CSIS analysis warns this marks "the beginning of a new phase of cyber escalation" under Iran's "Great Epic" cyber campaign. 313 Team explicitly framed this as retaliation for the "attack on a school in Minab" and "ongoing cyber assaults against the Resistance Axis."

🔗

Attack Chain

1. Reconnaissance
Public infrastructure mapping, identifying government portals and critical services
2. Tooling
Deploy custom DDoS tools from GitHub arsenal + commercial stressers
3. Execution
Coordinated DDoS attacks targeting web portals, DNS infrastructure, and API endpoints
4. Amplification
Immediate claims via Telegram, screenshots posted, coordination with other Axis groups
5. Persistence
Sustained attacks over 24-72 hours to maximize disruption and media coverage
ℹ️ Key Observation: Visibility Over Damage

313Team prioritizes operational visibility over technical sophistication or permanent damage. Attacks are designed to generate headlines, social media engagement, and psychological impact — not data theft or ransomware monetization. This aligns with IRGC influence operations doctrine.

🎭

Group Profile: 313 Team

Actor Name
313 Team / 313 Team Hack Team
First Observed
December 18, 2023
State Affiliation
Iran — MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence)
Motivation
Political / Destructive / Hack-and-Leak
Primary Targets
Israeli orgs, US allies, Healthcare, Energy
Operational Doctrine
Disrupt + Leak + Amplify
Attribution Confidence
HIGH (multi-vendor convergence)
TLP Classification
TLP:CLEAR

Cross-Vendor Alias Mapping

Multiple independent vendors and government sources have converged on attributing 313 Team to the same MOIS-linked cluster:

VendorCluster NameConfidence
Check Point ResearchVoid ManticoreHIGH
MicrosoftStorm-0842 / Storm-842HIGH
CrowdStrikeBANISHED KITTENHIGH
Recorded FutureDuneMEDIUM-HIGH
SophosCOBALT MYSTIQUEMEDIUM-HIGH
IBM X-Force313 Team Hacking TeamHIGH

Who is 313 Team?

"313 Team" refers to a character created in 1969 by Palestinian political cartoonist Naji al-Ali — a barefoot boy with his back turned, symbolizing Palestinian identity and defiance. The hacktivist group adopted this symbolism upon emergence in December 2023, shortly after the onset of the Gaza conflict.

The group operates as an influence-enabled intrusion threat — not a traditional cybercrime or espionage actor. Their operational model fuses technical compromise with rapid public messaging, timed data leaks, and narrative amplification designed to maximize reputational damage beyond direct system impact.

Key characteristics:

  • Employs wiper malware, data theft, phishing, extortion, and website defacement
  • Targets life-critical sectors: healthcare, energy, financial services, satellite communications
  • Operates data leak sites + Telegram channels for claim amplification
  • At least one member assessed to be fluent in Hebrew (Cisco Talos assessment)
  • Known to exaggerate or fabricate breach claims — actor claims should be treated as collection leads, not confirmation
  • Exploits current events for phishing lures (CrowdStrike outage, geopolitical escalations)

Target Sectors

Attack Timeline

June 13, 2023
313Team Founded
Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq officially established. GitHub repository created with initial tooling.
June 2025
Truth Social DDoS Attack
313Team claims DDoS attack against Truth Social (Trump family platform) in response to US nuclear strikes against Iran. Attack began ~20 minutes after Trump social media post.
August 19, 2025
Saudi Arabia Warning Issued
313Team issues public statement condemning Saudi government policies toward Israel, warning of "severe cyberattacks" if action not taken.
December 11, 2023
Absher Platform Attack
Sustained DDoS campaign against Saudi Arabia's Absher government services platform. Group claims "only we decide when to stop it."
February 2026
Kuwait Government Infrastructure
Large-scale attack targeting 26 Kuwaiti government IP domains. Sustained operations for 72+ hours affecting defense, health, and civil infrastructure.
March 2026 (Ongoing)
Expanded GCC Campaign
Coordinated attacks across GCC: Saudi banks (Riyad Bank, Al Rajhi Bank), Kuwait International Airport, Bahrain Batelco, UAE telecom operator du, and multiple government ministries.
🏥

Behavioral Patterns & TTPs

4.1 Primary Attack Methodology: DDoS

The 313 Team's primary offensive capability is Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against web-accessible government and institutional portals. The group leverages a combination of infrastructure from the Liwa Awli Aleazm software development wing, coalition-pooled botnet resources, and open-source DDoS tooling shared across Islamic Cyber Resistance Axis members. Attack proof methodology follows a consistent pattern: CheckHost.net or similar uptime verification services are used to generate third-party connection timeout screenshots, which are posted to the group's Telegram channel with target URL, timestamp, and claimed duration.

4.2 Website Defacement Operations

Secondary to DDoS, the 313 Team conducts website defacements as psychological operations. Defaced pages deploy coordinated coalition branding — unified 'Electronic Operations Room' banners referencing 313 Team, Moroccan Black Cyber Army, RipperSec, Cyb3rDrag0nzz, and affiliated groups. This branding strategy serves dual purposes: amplifying apparent coalition size and creating sustained psychological pressure on target governments. Joint defacement operations with Cyber Islamic Resistance against Saudi UBT are confirmed by multiple intelligence sources.

4.3 Claimed Intelligence Gathering & ICS Access

The group has claimed CCTV access to Bahraini government facilities, publishing still images as evidence of surveillance system compromise. Additionally, the Electronic Operations Room coordination has involved claims of ICS/OT access to Gulf government portals — a qualitative escalation that, if verified, would represent a significant capability expansion beyond typical hacktivist profiles. These claims remain unverified by independent technical sources; however, RH-ISAC notes that 'the shift from web defacements toward claimed PLC access and power plant manipulation marks a qualitative escalation' across the broader Cyber Islamic Resistance coalition.

4.4 Telegram-Centric Command, Control & Communication

All 313 Team operations are coordinated, claimed, and amplified through Telegram. The group maintains dedicated operational channels for attack announcements, target lists, proof screenshots, and coalition coordination. ICT analysis of Telegram messaging patterns identified over 250,000 messages across 178+ hacktivist and proxy groups during the June 2025 conflict cycle, with 313 Team and Islamic Cyber Resistance maintaining sustained activity. The group also uses Telegram Stars (Telegram's payment system) for potential financing flows, consistent with broader pro-Iranian hacktivist monetization observed by ICT.

4.5 SQL Injection & Web Application Exploitation

The 313 Team GitHub organization hosts HackBar — a browser-based security audit tool enabling SQL injection, XSS testing, and web application reconnaissance. This tooling, developed under the Liwa Awli Aleazm wing, indicates the group maintains basic web application attack capabilities beyond volumetric DDoS. The FAD Team (a coalition partner also operating from Iraq) has claimed SQL injection-based data exfiltration against similar target sets, suggesting capability sharing across Axis members.

4.6 Propaganda & Psychological Operations

The group deploys AI-generated propaganda imagery across Telegram — burning city imagery, Islamic iconography, and multilingual threat messages targeting Kuwaiti, Saudi, Jordanian, and US audiences. This psychological operations component is coordinated with SEPAHCYBERY (an IRGC-linked channel) and broader pro-Iranian media infrastructure. The aim is to create public uncertainty about government service availability and amplify the perceived impact of technical disruptions.

⛓️

Attack Chain — MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access
Phishing / Credential Theft / Admin Account Compromise
Execution
NSIS Installer → Batch Script → AutoIt Shellcode
Evasion
AV Process Check + Time Delay + Obfuscation
Privilege Esc
BYOVD (ListOpenedFileDrv) + Admin Abuse
Collection
System Info → Telegram Bot C2
Impact
Disk Wipe + Intune MDM Abuse + Defacement

Detailed Kill Chain (Based on Documented 313 Team Tradecraft)

1. Initial Access — 313 Team typically uses spear-phishing with current-events lures. For the 313 Team attack, initial access vector is under investigation. Previous campaigns used phishing PDFs masquerading as software updates, SMS phishing, and abuse of trusted supplier channels. The attackers gained access to administrative accounts with Intune/Entra management privileges.

2. Payload Delivery — Documented 313 Team toolkit uses NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) installers containing obfuscated batch scripts. Files within the NSIS package use no-file-extensions to evade static analysis. Commercial file-sharing services (Storj, Mega) used for payload hosting.

3. Execution — Batch script ("Carroll") copies itself to .cmd extension and executes. Contains garbage/invalid Windows commands interspersed with real instructions to hinder analysis. Checks for AV processes (Webroot, Quick Heal, Avast, AVG, Bitdefender, Norton, Sophos) and introduces 90–180 second delays if not found.

4. Defense Evasion — Multi-component payload distributed across several files, concatenated at runtime into AutoIt3.exe and .a3x script. Simple string obfuscation in AutoIt component. Architecture-aware shellcode (x32/x64) using RtlDecompressFragment() API.

5. Impact — Wiper overwrites files with 4,096 bytes of random data (files < 4,096 bytes overwritten with zeroes). Files deleted after overwrite. BYOVD technique using ListOpenedFileDrv_32.sys driver to access kernel memory for file enumeration. Deceptive "update installation" message box displayed while wiping occurs. System information exfiltrated to Telegram bot C2 before destruction.

🛡

TTPs & MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Evidence
Resource Dev. Acquire Infrastructure T1583 DDoS botnet infrastructure; coalition tool pooling
Resource Dev. Establish Accounts T1585 Telegram channel networks; GitHub tooling repos
Initial Access Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 SQL injection tooling (HackBar); web portal targeting
Initial Access Drive-by Compromise T1189 Defacement delivery via web server exploitation
Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 HackBar web audit tool; custom DDoS scripts
Persistence Defacement T1491.001 Government portal homepage replacements with coalition branding
Collection Screen Capture T1113 Alleged CCTV access — Bahrain government facilities
Impact Network Denial of Service T1498 Primary tactic — 26 Kuwait gov domains targeted
Impact Endpoint Denial of Service T1499 Web application flooding — e-government portal
Impact Defacement: External T1491.001 Joint defacements with CIR (Saudi UBT, Israeli sites)
C&C Application Layer Protocol: Web T1071.001 Telegram C2 and coordination channels
ICS — Impact Denial of Control (ICS) T0813 Claimed ICS/OT access to Gulf gov portals (unverified)
🔍

Indicators of Compromise

7.1 Primary Confirmed Targets — Kuwait Government Domains

Domain / URL Entity Attack Type Claimed
kuwaitarmy[.]gov[.]kwKuwait Armed ForcesDDoS — 1hr shutdown claimed
mod[.]gov[.]kwMinistry of DefenseDDoS — disruption claimed
e[.]gov[.]kwKuwait e-Government PortalDDoS — 18hr outage claimed
knguard[.]gov[.]kwKuwait National GuardDDoS — disruption claimed
moe[.]gov[.]kwMinistry of ElectricityDDoS — disruption claimed
moh[.]gov[.]kwMinistry of HealthDDoS — disruption claimed
cait[.]gov[.]kwCentral Agency for ITDDoS — disruption claimed
pam[.]gov[.]kwPublic Authority for ManpowerDDoS — disruption claimed
mpw[.]gov[.]kwMinistry of Public WorksDDoS — disruption claimed
paci[.]gov[.]kwPublic Authority for Civil InfoDDoS — disruption claimed
csb[.]gov[.]kwCivil Service CommissionDDoS — disruption claimed
kcb[.]com[.]kwKuwait Credit BankDDoS — disruption claimed

7.2 Infrastructure Indicators

GitHub
github[.]com/313Team/
Handle
Hacker Al-Imamah313
Telegram
313Team channel (operational announcements)
Verification Tool
check-host[.]net

7.3 Coalition Member Groups

  • RipperSec — DDoS and attack execution coalition partner
  • Cyb3rDrag0nzz — Defacement and wiper coalition partner
  • Holy League — Islamic Cyber Resistance Axis member
  • Tharulla Brigade — Islamic Cyber Resistance Axis member
  • Conquer Electronic Army (C.E. Army) — DDoS and coordination Axis member
  • Cyber Fattah Team — Axis member — hack-and-leak operations
  • FAD Team / Fatimiyoun Cyber Team — Iraqi partner — SQL injection, PII exposure
  • Fatemiyoun Electronic Team — Iran-aligned partner — GCC targeting
  • Moroccan Black Cyber Army — Coalition branding partner — defacements
🔬

Sigma Detection Rules

YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-001 — DDoS Volumetric Attack — Government Portal
title: 313 Team DDoS Volumetric Attack Against Government Web Portal
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP/HTTPS flood patterns consistent with 313 Team
  DDoS methodology targeting .gov.kw and regional government portals
logsource: 
  category: network 
  product: firewall
detection:
  selection:
    dst_port|in: [80, 443]
    dst_host|endswith:
      - '.gov.kw'
      - '.gov.jo'
      - '.mod.gov.kw'
  threshold:
    field: src_ip
    count: '>500'
    timespan: '60s'
  condition: selection and threshold
falsepositives: Legitimate traffic spikes during peak hours
level: high
tags: [313Team, Islamic_Cyber_Resistance, ddos, kuwait]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-002 — Web Application SQL Injection — HackBar Patterns
title: 313 Team HackBar SQL Injection Attempt
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL injection and XSS probing consistent with
  HackBar tooling used by Liwa Awli Aleazm development wing
logsource: 
  category: webserver 
  product: apache|nginx
detection:
  selection_sqli:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - "' OR '1'='1"
      - "UNION SELECT"
      - "1=1--"
      - "admin'--"
  selection_xss:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - '<script>'
      - 'javascript:'
      - 'onerror='
  condition: selection_sqli or selection_xss
falsepositives: Security scanners, penetration tests
level: medium
tags: [313Team, HackBar, sqli, xss, web_exploit]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-003 — Website Defacement — Government Portal Content Replace
title: 313 Team Coalition Branding Defacement Upload
status: experimental
description: Detects file uploads or webshell writes consistent with
  313 Team / Cyber Islamic Resistance defacement methodology
logsource: 
  category: file_event 
  product: windows|linux
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - 'index.html'
      - 'index.php'
      - 'default.aspx'
    EventType: 'FileCreate'
    User|not-contains: 'SYSTEM'
  web_root:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '/var/www/'
      - '/inetpub/wwwroot/'
      - 'htdocs'
  condition: selection and web_root
falsepositives: Legitimate web deployments
level: high
tags: [313Team, defacement, web_compromise, CIR]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-004 — Telegram C2 / Coalition Coordination Beacon
title: 313 Team Telegram Infrastructure Communication
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound HTTP connections to Telegram API endpoints
  consistent with 313 Team attack coordination and C2 patterns
logsource: 
  category: proxy 
  product: proxy
detection:
  selection:
    cs-host|endswith: 'api.telegram.org'
    cs-method: 'POST'
    cs-uri-path|contains: '/bot'
  internal_src:
    src_ip|cidr:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
  condition: selection and internal_src
falsepositives: Legitimate Telegram bots, notification services
level: medium
tags: [313Team, telegram, c2, coordination]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-005 — Check-Host Uptime Verification Beacon
title: 313 Team Check-Host Attack Validation Pattern
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound connections to check-host.net or similar
  uptime monitoring services used by 313 Team to validate DDoS impact
  and generate proof screenshots for Telegram claim posting
logsource: 
  category: proxy 
  product: proxy
detection:
  selection:
    cs-host|endswith:
      - 'check-host.net'
      - 'isitdownrightnow.com'
      - 'downdetector.com'
  query_gov:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - '.gov.kw'
      - 'mod.gov.kw'
      - 'kuwaitarmy'
      - '.gov.jo'
  condition: selection and query_gov
falsepositives: Low — government IT staff performing availability checks
level: medium
tags: [313Team, ddos_validation, check_host, proof_collection]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-006 — CCTV / Surveillance System Unauthorized Access
title: Suspicious CCTV DVR/NVR Authentication — 313 Team TTPs
status: experimental
description: Detects brute force or default credential authentication
  attempts against DVR/NVR systems consistent with 313 Team claimed
  surveillance access in Bahrain government facilities
logsource: 
  category: network 
  product: ids
detection:
  selection:
    dst_port|in: [554, 8080, 8081, 37777, 34567, 9000]
  brute:
    EventType: 'auth_failure'
    count: '>5'
    timespan: '60s'
  known_cctv_ua:
    http.user_agent|contains:
      - 'Dahua'
      - 'Hikvision'
      - 'RTSP'
  condition: (selection and brute) or (selection and known_cctv_ua)
falsepositives: Legitimate CCTV management activity
level: medium
tags: [313Team, cctv, surveillance, initial_access, IoT]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-007 — HTTP Flood Signature — Multi-Source Same Target
title: Multi-Source HTTP Flood Consistent with 313 Team DDoS
status: experimental
description: Detects distributed HTTP flood from multiple source IPs
  targeting same government web endpoint — characteristic of 313 Team
  coalition-pooled DDoS infrastructure methodology
logsource: 
  category: network 
  product: waf
detection:
  selection:
    http.method: 'GET'
    http.status: ['200', '503', '504']
  concentration:
    dst_host: same_value
    src_ip: 
      unique_count: '>50'
    timespan: '30s'
    request_rate: '>1000/s'
  condition: selection and concentration
falsepositives: Legitimate high-traffic events, CDN origin pulls
level: high
tags: [313Team, ddos, http_flood, botnet, coalition]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-008 — ICS/OT Protocol Anomaly — Government Utility Network
title: Suspicious ICS Protocol Access — 313 Team ICS Claim TTPs
status: experimental
description: Detects anomalous access to industrial control protocols
  in government networks consistent with claimed 313 Team / CIR ICS
  access targeting Gulf government utility and defense infrastructure
logsource: 
  category: network 
  product: ids
detection:
  selection:
    dst_port|in: [502, 102, 20000, 44818, 47808, 1911, 4840]
    EventType: 'new_connection'
  not_expected:
    src_ip|not-cidr:
      - '192.168.100.0/24'
      - '10.10.10.0/24'
  condition: selection and not_expected
falsepositives: Authorized ICS vendor access, patch windows
level: critical
tags: [313Team, ICS, OT, modbus, S7, dnp3, critical_infra]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-009 — Coordinated Defacement Branding Keywords
title: 313 Team / Cyber Islamic Resistance Defacement Content Detection
status: experimental
description: Detects web application response content containing
  313 Team or Islamic Cyber Resistance coalition branding keywords
  inserted during defacement operations
logsource: 
  category: webserver 
  product: apache|nginx|iis
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-stem|endswith:
      - '/index.html'
      - '/index.php'
      - '/'
  branding_keywords:
    response_body|contains:
      - '313 Team'
      - 'Islamic Cyber Resistance'
      - 'Electronic Operations Room'
      - 'Al-Imamah313'
      - 'Liwa Awli Aleazm'
  condition: selection and branding_keywords
falsepositives: Near-zero — keywords unique to this group
level: critical
tags: [313Team, defacement, branding, IOC, web_compromise]
YAML
# 313T-SIGMA-010 — Coalition Target List Domain Reconnaissance
title: 313 Team Pre-Attack Government Portal Reconnaissance
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS resolution or HTTP probing of known 313 Team
  declared target domains from non-government source IPs, consistent
  with pre-attack reconnaissance pattern
logsource: 
  category: dns 
  product: dns
detection:
  selection:
    dns.query.name|in:
      - 'kuwaitarmy.gov.kw'
      - 'mod.gov.kw'
      - 'knguard.gov.kw'
      - 'moe.gov.kw'
      - 'e.gov.kw'
      - 'cait.gov.kw'
      - 'moh.gov.kw'
  suspicious_src:
    src_ip|not-cidr:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '46.x.x.x'
  query_rate:
    count: '>10'
    timespan: '60s'
  condition: selection and suspicious_src
falsepositives: Search engines, CDN health checks
level: medium
tags: [313Team, recon, dns, kuwait_gov, pre_attack]
🧬

YARA Detection Rules

YARA
rule 313 Team_Wiper_Carroll_Batch {
    meta:
        description = "Detects 313 Team wiper obfuscated batch script (Carroll)"
        author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-03-11"
        reference = "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/313 Teams-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html"
        tlp = "TLP:CLEAR"
        severity = "CRITICAL"
    
    strings:
        $cmd_copy = "cmd /k copy" ascii nocase
        $carroll = "Carroll" ascii
        $cmd_ext = ".cmd" ascii
        $exit = "& exit" ascii
        
        // AV process checks
        $av1 = "wrsa.exe" ascii nocase
        $av2 = "opssvc.exe" ascii nocase
        $av3 = "avastui.exe" ascii nocase
        $av4 = "avgui.exe" ascii nocase
        $av5 = "bdservicehost.exe" ascii nocase
        $av6 = "nswscsvc.exe" ascii nocase
        $av7 = "sophoshealth.exe" ascii nocase
        
        // Time delay evasion
        $ping_delay = "ping -n" ascii nocase
    
    condition:
        filesize < 500KB and
        (($cmd_copy and $carroll and $cmd_ext) or
         (3 of ($av*) and $ping_delay))
}

rule 313 Team_Wiper_AutoIt_Loader {
    meta:
        description = "Detects 313 Team AutoIt-based wiper payload loader"
        author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-03-11"
        severity = "CRITICAL"
    
    strings:
        $autoit_header = "#AutoIt3Wrapper" ascii
        $rtl_decompress = "RtlDecompressFragment" ascii wide
        $shellcode_x86 = { 55 8B EC 83 EC ?? 53 56 57 }
        $shellcode_x64 = { 48 89 5C 24 ?? 48 89 74 24 ?? 57 48 83 EC }
        $regasm = "RegAsm" ascii wide nocase
        $inject_api = "NtWriteVirtualMemory" ascii wide
        $create_proc = "CreateProcessA" ascii wide
    
    condition:
        filesize < 5MB and
        ($autoit_header or $rtl_decompress) and
        ($regasm or $inject_api or $create_proc) and
        any of ($shellcode_*)
}

rule 313 Team_Wiper_Disk_Overwrite {
    meta:
        description = "Detects 313 Team wiper disk overwrite component"
        author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-03-11"
        severity = "CRITICAL"
    
    strings:
        // File overwrite patterns
        $overwrite_func = { 8B ?? ?? 83 ?? 00 10 00 00 }  // 4096 byte check
        $random_fill = "RtlGenRandom" ascii wide
        $zero_fill = { C7 ?? 00 00 00 00 C7 ?? 04 00 00 00 00 }
        
        // System info gathering (pre-wipe recon)
        $hostname = "COMPUTERNAME" ascii wide
        $username = "USERNAME" ascii wide
        $domain = "USERDOMAIN" ascii wide
        $diskspace = "GetDiskFreeSpaceEx" ascii wide
        
        // Telegram C2
        $telegram = "api.telegram.org" ascii wide
        $bot_token = "/bot" ascii wide
        $send_msg = "sendMessage" ascii wide
        $send_doc = "sendDocument" ascii wide
        
        // IP check
        $ip_check = "icanhazip.com" ascii wide
    
    condition:
        filesize < 10MB and
        (2 of ($overwrite_func, $random_fill, $zero_fill)) and
        (2 of ($hostname, $username, $domain, $diskspace)) and
        ($telegram or $ip_check)
}

rule 313 Team_BYOVD_ListOpenedFileDrv {
    meta:
        description = "Detects BYOVD driver used by 313 Team for kernel file enumeration"
        author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-03-11"
        severity = "HIGH"
    
    strings:
        $pdb = "openfilefinder_src" ascii nocase
        $driver_name = "ListOpenedFileDrv" ascii wide nocase
        $device_io = "DeviceIoControl" ascii wide
        $file_object = "FILE_OBJECT" ascii wide
    
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize < 100KB and
        ($pdb or $driver_name) and
        ($device_io or $file_object)
}

rule 313 Team_NSIS_NoExtension_Payload {
    meta:
        description = "Detects NSIS installer with no-extension payload files (313 Team delivery)"
        author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-03-11"
        severity = "HIGH"
    
    strings:
        $nsis_header = { EF BE AD DE 4E 75 6C 6C }  // NSIS magic
        $nsis_str = "Nullsoft" ascii
        $cmd_copy_pattern = "cmd /k copy" ascii nocase
        $autoit_ref = "AutoIt" ascii nocase
        $concat_pattern = /copy\s+\/b\s+\w+\+\w+/ ascii nocase
    
    condition:
        ($nsis_header or $nsis_str) and
        ($cmd_copy_pattern or $autoit_ref or $concat_pattern)
}

rule 313 Team_BiBi_Wiper_Family {
    meta:
        description = "Detects BiBi wiper variants associated with 313 Team/Void Manticore"
        author = "HAWK-EYE Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-03-11"
        reference = "Check Point Research - Void Manticore"
        severity = "CRITICAL"
    
    strings:
        $bibi_str1 = "BiBi" ascii wide nocase
        $bibi_str2 = "[+] Stats:" ascii
        $wiper_msg = "You have been pwned" ascii wide nocase
        $ext_target = ".pdf" ascii
        $ext_target2 = ".docx" ascii
        $ext_target3 = ".xlsx" ascii
        
        // Disk operations
        $raw_disk = "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive" ascii wide
        $partition = "\\\\.\\PHYSICALDRIVE" ascii wide
        $mbr_access = { B8 00 00 00 00 BA 00 00 00 00 }
    
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize < 5MB and
        (($bibi_str1 or $bibi_str2 or $wiper_msg) and
         ($raw_disk or $partition or $mbr_access))
}

Defensive Recommendations

⚠️ ELEVATED RISK

The 313 Team's explicit framing of Kuwait as a military front (citing US forces at Ali Al Salem Air Base), combined with the kinetic drone strike against that base on March 7, 2026, creates conditions for sustained, intensifying cyber operations against Kuwaiti critical infrastructure. Organizations operating water, electricity, health, and financial systems should activate elevated DDoS and ICS monitoring postures immediately.

🛡️ 8.1 DDoS Mitigation (CRITICAL — Immediate)

  • Deploy cloud-based DDoS protection (Cloudflare Magic Transit, Akamai Prolexic, AWS Shield Advanced) upstream of all government web portals — particularly e.gov.kw, mod.gov.kw, and kuwaitarmy.gov.kw
  • Configure rate limiting at WAF layer: block IP sources generating >200 requests/minute to government portal endpoints
  • Implement BGP blackhole routing capability for rapid upstream traffic diversion during active flood
  • Establish DDoS playbook with ISP-level scrubbing SLAs under 15 minutes activation time
  • Enable Anycast IP distribution for public-facing portals to diffuse volumetric attacks geographically

🔒 8.2 Web Application Hardening

  • Deploy WAF in blocking mode with OWASP CRS ruleset for all government web portals — highest priority for SQL injection and XSS protection given HackBar tooling evidence
  • Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on web server document roots to detect defacement writes in real time
  • Restrict HTTP methods — disable PUT, DELETE, TRACE on production web servers
  • Enforce Content Security Policy (CSP) headers to prevent injected script execution in defaced pages
  • Conduct web application penetration testing against all public-facing government portals before conflict escalation reaches critical infrastructure phase

🌐 8.3 Infrastructure & Network Defense

  • Segment ICS/OT networks completely from internet-accessible infrastructure — given coalition ICS access claims, network segmentation is now highest-priority defensive action for utility and defense networks
  • Audit all CCTV/DVR/NVR devices for default credentials; enforce password rotation and disable remote access where not operationally required
  • Deploy network anomaly detection (Darktrace, Vectra, Claroty for ICS) to identify lateral movement toward critical systems
  • Block outbound connections to check-host.net from government network perimeter — reduces attacker visibility into DDoS impact

📊 8.4 Monitoring & Detection

  • Configure SIEM alerting on the 10 Sigma rules provided in Section 6 — prioritize 313T-SIGMA-001 (DDoS volumetric), 313T-SIGMA-008 (ICS anomaly), and 313T-SIGMA-009 (defacement branding) as critical alerts
  • Establish 24/7 dark web and Telegram monitoring for 313 Team and Islamic Cyber Resistance channels — advance warning on target lists precedes most attacks by 12–48 hours
  • Subscribe to FalconFeeds.io, SOCRadar, and Flashpoint for real-time 313 Team claim intelligence
  • Establish baseline traffic profiles for all government portals to enable rapid DDoS detection threshold tuning

🚨 8.5 Incident Response Readiness

  • Pre-position DDoS incident response runbooks for all 12 explicitly named Kuwait government portal targets
  • Establish out-of-band communications (non-internet dependent) between government ministries to maintain coordination during portal outages
  • Test website restoration procedures from clean backups — ensure defacement recovery time < 30 minutes for high-visibility portals
  • Coordinate with CIRT Kuwait and GCC-CERT on shared threat intelligence, particularly regarding 313 Team Telegram activity
📊

Threat Landscape Visualization

Attack Techniques by Frequency

Campaign Timeline: 313 Team Operations

📚

References & Sources

Source Title
Palo Alto Unit 42 Threat Brief: March 2026 Escalation of Cyber Risk Related to Iran (March 9, 2026)
Flashpoint Escalation in the Middle East: Tracking Operation Epic Fury Across Military and Cyber Domains (March 10, 2026)
Cisco Talos Update, March 10: Talos on the Developing Situation in the Middle East (March 10, 2026)
SOCRadar Iran vs. Israel & US Cyber War 2026: Operation Epic Fury Threat Intelligence (March 10, 2026)
SOCRadar Telegram Hacktivist Activity Timeline of Iran–Israel–US War (March 2026)
FalconFeeds.io Islamic Cyber Resistance — Team 313 claims Kuwait MoD website attack (March 2026)
FalconFeeds.io 313 Team Claims Ongoing Cyberattacks on Kuwait — 72-hour campaign, 26 domains (March 2026)
The Hacker News 149 Hacktivist DDoS Attacks Hit 110 Organizations in 16 Countries After Middle East Conflict (March 9, 2026)
Radware The hacktivist threat in the Middle East — Kuwait 28% of all attack claims. Radware DDoS Threat Report 2026
RH-ISAC Middle East Conflict Cyber Threat Landscape (March 2026)
ICT Cyber-Terrorism Desk Monthly Trend Report: January 2026 — Islamic Cyber Resistance Axis structure
CSIS Strategic Technologies Blog Beyond Hacktivism: Iran's Coordinated Cyber Threat Landscape (2025)
SecurityScorecard STRIKE From the Depths of the Shadows: IRGC and Hacker Collectives of the 12-Day War (August 2025)
Computer Weekly Iranian Hacktivists Muster Their Forces But State APTs Lay Low (March 6, 2026)
ISMC/GovInfoSecurity Cyberattacks and Unpredictable Targeting Remain an Iran Risk (March 6, 2026)
Hunter Strategy Surge in Cyber Threats: Middle East Activities (March 2026)
GitHub / 313Team 313Team GitHub Organization — tooling repositories and group description
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise and ICS ATT&CK Framework v15 (2025)
📄 TLP:WHITE

This report may be freely shared. Produced March 2026 | Version 1.0 | For Authorized Use